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Örjan Svane, Josefin Wangel, Lars A. Engberg & Jenny Palm

Department of Urban Planning and Environment, KTH The Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

Danish Building Research Institute, Hørsholm, Denmark

Technology and Social Change, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden

Available online: 10 Nov 2011


To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19463138.2011.620959
Compromise and learning when negotiating sustainabilities: the brownfield development of Hammarby Sjöstad, Stockholm

Örjan Svane*, Josefin Wangel†, Lars A. Engberg‡ and Jenny Palm§

*Department of Urban Planning and Environment, KTH The Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden; †Danish Building Research Institute, Hørsholm, Denmark; ‡Technology and Social Change, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden

(Received 30 May 2011; final version received 31 August 2011)

This article examines the environmental management of Stockholm’s large brownfield development Hammarby Sjöstad through the concept of negotiating sustainabilities. An Environmental Programme injected exceptional aims into an ongoing, ordinary planning process involving developers, consultants, contractors and other stakeholders. In parallel, a project team was established and given the task of realising aims through governing, networking, negotiation and persuasion. Discourse theory is used to analyse the epistemological disagreement between actors on how to operationalise the aims. Theories on governance networks and meta-governance facilitate the understanding of the project team’s role in negotiations. The analysis is divided into two parts: ‘Playing the game’ focuses on the aim contents and how these were negotiated between actors, while ‘... but the game was staged’ highlights how negotiations were conditioned from the outside. The results indicate that negotiations on, for example, development contracts were circumscribed by a prehistory of institutional and interactive positioning, thus leaving only a small imprint on the actual outcome. Negotiations during events unburdened by path dependency affected outcomes more. Staging of the project team’s activities was initially strong, but gradually waned. Learning within the team was rapid and gradually resulted in a higher level of aim fulfilment. After 10 years, learning is clearly discernible in other Stockholm developments too, such as the Royal Seaport. International interest, as manifested through study visits to the area, remains high. The main general lessons learned include the need for introducing exceptional aims and project organisations early in the project, and the potentially positive effects of active networking to increase actor collaboration and thus the project’s field of options.

Keywords: negotiating sustainabilities; situation of opportunity; network governance; meta-governor; Hammarby Sjöstad, Stockholm

1. Introduction: background, purpose and research questions

Hammarby Sjöstad, a new city district just south of central Stockholm, is internationally well known as an outstanding example of urban sustainable development (see, e.g. Hammarby Sjöstad (HAST) 2011a, 2011b). It is less known that when comprehensive planning of the area started, around 1990, it was quite an ordinary development. However, a couple of years later, the project was made a key element in another process – the lobbying for Stockholm to host the 2004 Olympic Games. Hammarby Sjöstad was denoted the Olympic village to be and, following this, the project changed in two fundamental ways. A comprehensive Environmental Programme was developed and
passed (Stockholms Stad 1997) and a project team was established, comprising representatives from the city administration and companies. This organisation integrated the city’s actors, creating a potentially powerful meta-governor for the project. The project team was given the task not only of speeding up the planning process, but also of realising the Environmental Programme – not only through ordinary governing routines, but also through networking and novel ways of negotiation and persuasion. Thus, into an ongoing planning process was injected an exceptional series of aims and an equally uncommon meta-actor.

The aim of this article is to explore how the project team managed to incorporate the Environmental Programme into the ongoing, ordinary development process through different ways of negotiation. In order to better understand why certain negotiations were more successful than others, we also study how these were structured by events outside the project team’s direct influence. More specifically, we ask the following:

- How did the project team manage to incorporate the Environmental Programme into the ongoing, ordinary development process?
- Why were some negotiations more successful than others?
- To what extent and how was the project team’s work influenced by external events and forces?

Although construction in Hammarby Sjöstad will continue for another few years, planning and development nowadays follow well-established routines and many of the once very novel green technologies are becoming rather out of date. Still, interest in the area and its achievements remains high. In the last few years, Stockholm has initiated new large-scale developments with similar ambitions, for which the city claims that the experience from the environmental management of Hammarby Sjöstad will be applied. Thus, in analysing the findings, we also aim to explore the following:

- What in more general terms can be learned from these negotiations – explicitly for the benefit of new planning projects?

2. Hammarby Sjöstad: a brownfield development

Hammarby Sjöstad is a continuation of Stockholm’s inner city towards the south. When fully developed in 2017, the area will have 11,000 flats for 25,000 residents and at least another 5000 workplaces. Planning has focused on its waterside setting, not only transforming an old industrial and harbour area into a modern environment with a distinctively urban character, but also utilising its location near the Nacka nature reserve (HAST 2011a, 2011b).

2.1. The Environmental Programme

The overarching aim of Hammarby Sjöstad’s Environmental Programme is that the area should perform ‘twice as well’ as ordinary new housing of the time (Stockholms Stad 1997). The programme comprises objectives under six main headings:

- Land use
- Soil decontamination
- Technical supply: energy, waste and water sewage
- Transport
- Construction materials
- Noise

For each of its main headings, the Environmental Programme has a descriptive and argumentative part. Arguments relate strongly to the conditions in the late 1990s in Stockholm and Hammarby Sjöstad, but weakly to the global challenge of sustainable development. Furthermore, the arguments do not relate to a vision of Stockholm as a sustainable city. In an appendix, the objectives are quantified as ‘operative guiding aims’, mainly in relative terms: for example, ‘80% of commuting is undertaken by public transport, bike or on foot’ (Stockholms Stad 1997). However, the objective for energy is absolute: ‘The total need for supplied energy should not exceed 60 kWh/m²’ (Stockholms Stad 1997). The programme also comprises social and economic objectives, but these are not as concrete as the others, nor as comprehensive. The area’s performance in relation to the operational goals has recently
been evaluated by Pandis Iverot and Brandt (2011).

2.2. Project management

Like any planning project, Hammarby Sjöstad involves a variety of actors: several city administrations, the municipal companies for water, waste and energy and the regional public transport company Storstockholms Lokaltrafik (SL), to mention the main authorities. Private developers, municipal housing companies, architects and other consultants also play important roles. However, many of these participate only for a short period; once the design phase is over, the architects are little involved according to Swedish practice, to give one example.

Furthermore, the Hammarby Sjöstad project is divided into 15 planning areas, each of which is further subdivided into a number of development parts forming separate but interconnected projects. Thus, the project team’s negotiating counterpart in each contracted part was a unique, temporary organisation consisting of a developer, consultants and/or a contractor.

As formulated in the programme, the environmental objectives can only be realised if actors and stakeholders combine efforts (Stockholms Stad 1997); besides the project team, developers, consultants and contractors all have their share. For example, for objectives on transport, waste and energy use, the users and managers of the area must also contribute. The project team thus has only partial control over realisation. Influencing the other stakeholders through indirect, informal means – for instance, through negotiations – becomes a main task.

3. Theoretical and analytical framework

The theoretical framework of this article draws mainly from three bodies of literature brought together through the proposed concept of negotiating sustainability, defined as follows:

The negotiating of specific interpretations – in a given situation and by that situation’s actors – of the epistemological content and practical consequences of the term sustainability, in a strategic process that legitimises these actors’ specific interests in and understandings of sustainability in practice.

First, through a discursive approach, we adhere to and emphasise the epistemological openness of what is considered sustainable. Furthermore, we recognise that in practice this openness is circumscribed by persisting predominant discourses, causing inertia to change. However, there are also periods in time when inertia decreases. Thus, second, to explore these gaps in path dependency, we use the concept of situations of opportunity. Third, theories on network governance and metagovernance provide the basis for understanding how the project team made use of these gaps. Below, these theories and concepts are elaborated upon briefly.

3.1. Sustainabilities in a discursive perspective

The theoretical framework in this article draws on an understanding of sustainable development as ‘not merely ambiguous but essentially contested [recognising that] rather than focus on searching for a definitive meaning of sustainable development... it is necessary to recognise the multiplicity of sustainabilities and to analyse the ways in which these are shaped and mobilised in political discourse’ (Connelly 2007, p. 262).

In line with this, Hajer (1995) and Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) argue that environmental conflict should not be seen as ‘a conflict over a predefined, unequivocal problem with competing actors pro and con’, but rather as a struggle over the definition and meaning of the environmental problem itself (Hajer 1995, p. 14–15). In doing so, they argue that the way environmental problems are defined and narrated is determined by whether they appear as anomalies to existing institutional structures or can be processed by these same institutions (Hajer 1995, p. 4, 15). In other words, the environmental discourse is seen as a conglomerate of different claims and convictions that are negotiated in a way that reflects the stakeholders’ perceptions of feasible problem definitions and solutions.
Referring to the discursive approach, we see sustainability as a contested concept, not only when defining the problem but also when proposing measures and solutions. Thus we assume that material and epistemic conflicts exist between actors and that these conflicts reflect the actor’s specific understandings, interests and strategic positions in relation to the sustainability issue. By using the notion of ‘negotiating sustainabilities’ (Engberg 2005), we emphasise this epistemological openness, where interests, strategies and institutional path dependencies condition how the actors of a planning project develop environmental standards for the new urban fabric.

When actors negotiate, they resolve disputes and bargain for individual and collective advantage. Their incentive is that they share an overarching aim (or at least the need to come to agreement) and this induces them to create outcomes that will lead to mutual benefit, although they also have partly competing or mutually exclusive interests.

The outcome of negotiations is usually a trade-off. However, not all actors or interests are equals in terms of power and available resources, nor do they have the same discursive power. It has repeatedly been shown that, even in processes explicitly aiming for sustainable development, negotiations typically lead to the environment getting the worst deal (Dovlén 2005; Connelly and Richardson 2008).

### 3.2. Negotiating sustainabilities in situations of opportunity

In previous research, the environmental management of Hammarby Sjöstad was explored as a series of sub-processes related to major planning events. These sub-processes were conceptualised and narrated as situations of opportunity (Johansson and Svane 2002; Svane 2008), a concept with many similarities to, for example, ‘windows of opportunity’, ‘policy windows’, ‘formative moments’ (Kingdon 1995; Rothstein 1996) and ‘tipping points’ (Gladwell 2000; Urry 2007).

Unlike these, however, situations of opportunity is a normative concept since it is delimited to periods with the potential to result in outcomes favourable to sustainability objectives. Furthermore, the situation concept also includes the prehistory and outcomes of the openness (Jonsson 2006; Weingaertner et al. 2008). A situation of opportunity can thus be defined as a period in time characterised by an increased epistemological openness providing an opportunity to challenge the dominant discourse in favour of environmental sustainability. We assume that it is during these periods of epistemological openness that negotiations are most intense and influential. Following this, rather than including the entire planning process in analysis, we have chosen to delimit the objects of study to a number of these situations.

### 3.3. Meta-governing the negotiating of sustainabilities

The conflicts in planning have been effectively illustrated through the ‘planner’s triangle’ by Campbell (1996). In this, the planner’s role is depicted as mediating in the conflicts that emerge when negotiating priorities amongst social justice, environmental protection and economic development.

In this article, the planner’s role is interpreted from the perspective of network governance (Jessop 1998a, 1998b; Bogason 2000; Sehested 2002; Engberg 2003), in which the planning organisation takes the role of meta-governor (Sørensen 2006; Sehested 2009). In the literature, meta-governance is typically described as a way of indirect steering, a ‘regulation of the self-regulation’. This role is a multifaceted one: the meta-governor by turns can be initiator, co-ordinator, negotiator, promoter, signor of contracts, enforcer of planning documents and so on. The meta-governor can also play an important role as a proponent for voice-less or discursively weak stakeholders such as margin-alised groups, or the environment.

In viewing the Hammarby Sjöstad project team as the project’s meta-governor, we merge city administrations and companies into one meta-actor. This is admittedly a simplification, but through keeping the project team black-boxed we aim to keep the focus on the negotiations between
this organisation and external actors, rather than getting caught up in any internal disagreements and power struggles in the project team.

Kickert et al. (1999, p. 167–191) identify three basic perspectives on network governance from which the meta-governor’s negotiations can be viewed: (1) to formulate policy objectives and strive for their realisation (the instrumental perspective), (2) to steer relations and negotiations between actors (the interactive perspective) and (3) to handle path dependency and navigate within structural constraints (the institutional perspective). Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p. 240–260) describe the instrumental perspective as agenda setting, the interactive and institutional perspectives as game management. They add a fourth perspective, in which the meta-governor from the inside seeks to influence the structural conditions for meta-governance, naming it game structuring. Narrative policy analysis (Roe 1994) and analyses of discourse coalitions (Hajer 1995; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003) take similar approaches.

Covering all of these perspectives, Sehested (2009) proposes four categories of meta-governing techniques:

1. Network framing – pursuing a narrative strategy, creating common targets and so on. This is the instrumental steering perspective.
2. Network design – affecting which actors to include and utilising the actors’ strategic capacity, either as conditioned by their institutional affiliations or from a normative approach. This combines the structuring and interactive perspective.
3. Network management – facilitating and manipulating negotiations, which is similar to the interactive perspective.
4. Network participation – influencing the structural conditions for meta-governance through active participation. This includes the institutional perspective and game structuring.

3.4. Playing the game, but the game was staged

Sehested’s meta-governance techniques are used to define and concretise two types of negotiation situations: ‘playing the game’ and ‘... but the game was staged’. The first type of negotiation comprises events when the meta-governor can act through network framing, network design and network management. The second type highlights how negotiations are conditioned by factors outside the influence of the actors directly involved in a specific planning situation, and thus focuses on network participation. These external factors comprise an overarching level of ‘staging’ which can produce inertia for the meta-governor during negotiations, but which can also be empowering. It can also influence the meta-governor’s internal organisation.

In distinguishing between these two, we illustrate that meta-governance is multilevel and that the process of network governance is semi-open: it is institutionally embedded and rule and practice regulated. It is also a practice of negotiation and incremental decision-making.

4. Results

4.1. Playing the game

Narratives of two situations of opportunity illustrate the project team’s negotiations when playing the game. Both situations occurred in the first construction area, Sickla Udde. The period studied is 1997–2003, from the forming of the team until construction was finished. Data are taken from previous studies (Johansson and Svane 2002; Svane 2008).

4.1.1. Playing the game: development contracts in Sickla Udde

In Stockholm’s planning practice, large developments are divided into smaller development projects. For each of these, a contract is signed by a developer and a representative of the city’s Roads and Real Estate Administration. This development contract regulates the construction process as well as its outcome, and also economic issues. It supplements the Regulatory Detail Plan, another
strong policy instrument within the municipal planning monopoly. These documents have one fundamental difference: while the contract is signed by two parties after negotiations, the plan is issued by the city administration alone, albeit after negotiations.

The negotiations are characterised by the fact that both signatories have a strong interest in coming to an agreement. They also know that they will meet in other development projects. If the city owns the land, and the developer is private or a housing association, land purchase is part of the deal. Then the city’s negotiator can use the land price to compensate for the developer’s extra costs of green technologies or building materials. However, this was not evident in Sickla Udde since the city did not own all of the land.

On Sickla Udde, 10 contracts were negotiated (Figure 1). The signatory developers were private and municipal companies and the Stockholm Association of Housing Co-operatives. An officer at the city’s Roads and Real Estate Administration was the main negotiator on the city side. Both parties had support and advice from colleagues, in the developers’ case also from consultants and contractors to be.

Figure 1. Plan for Sickla Udde development area. In total, 1200 flats were built here between 2000 and 2003. Source: Stockholms Stad 2009.
The contracts were signed in spring 1998, shortly after the Regulatory Detail Plan for Sickla Udde was adopted. Negotiations proper were preceded by a long prehistory: already in the comprehensive planning of the early 1990s, before the Environmental Programme, Sickla Udde was divided into development projects; potential developers were identified through a preliminary land designation, which was then confirmed through the contracts.

As signed, the contracts stipulate that the Regulatory Detail Plan and the Quality Programme for Design must be complied with; there are also paragraphs on green areas, parking and procedural issues. To a large extent, the contracts at Sickla Udde are standard documents, in spite of the presence of the Environmental Programme and the team as negotiator.

Interviews indicate that during negotiations, there was little conflict concerning the Regulatory Detail Plan and the Quality Programme. On the other hand, the contracts as signed had an unresolved conflict between the Environmental Programme for Hammarby Sjöstad and the city’s Programme for Ecological Construction: the documents state that the developer ‘... undertakes to adhere to the Environmental Programme of Hammarby Sjöstad ... /through/... adhering to the requirements of the City’s Programme for Ecological Construction and striving for compliance with its aims’ (authors’ translation). The Ecological Construction Programme is a checklist with compulsory requirements and recommendations, as used in applications for building permits.

The checklist was appended to the contract with those objectives marked that the developer had agreed to follow. The potential conflict between the two sets of objectives was left for the developer to resolve. Moreover, most developers also had their own environmental programmes, for example, an ISO 14000 environmental management system. As part of programming and design, each developer merged these different programmes into a single, project-specific programme. ‘In practice, this programme is the one that will be followed in the first hand’ (interview with environmental officer, January 2002).

The municipal housing company Familjebostäder had one conflict with the team concerning the design of a pilot project building, where the southern facade has solar cells for producing electricity integrated into its design. This was adopted by the developer, but initially not by the city planner. Here, two aesthetic ideals clashed, but in the end the planner accepted that the pilot project should visualise the local production of energy.

The conflict on solar cells relates to a much wider issue that left no imprint on the development contracts. Before negotiations began, Sickla Udde developers compiled a report on the Environmental Programme (Kellner et al. 1997). In it, they claimed that the energy objectives were so strict that they could only be realised at the expense of the residents’ comfort. In parallel, there was a debate on the merits and shortcomings of local energy production. Were solar panels and cells to be part of the real estate or owned by the energy provider? Was installation technically feasible in an area connected to the district heating system? Was it financially sound? Should locally produced energy be excluded from the objective of 60 kWh/m² and year? This debate had no well-defined negotiation forum, nor was it addressed in the development contracts. Instead, it was ongoing for years after the first round of contracts was signed.

The contracts also stipulated that all developers and contractors must supply data to a computerised Life Cycle Assessment tool, the Environmental Load Profile (ELP) (Forsberg 2003). Developers and contractors claimed that great amounts of hard-to-find data would be required. On the other hand, the team argued that results from the ELP calculations would give detailed information on the environmental performance of the buildings. In the end, both parties were right. There were difficulties in obtaining data, but the assessment gave interesting results (Levin and Rönnkvist Mickelson 2004; Levin et al. 2005). However, these results have not been widely disseminated, probably because they
indicate that at 120 kWh/m² and year, the average level of energy use is twice the Environmental Programme’s aim.

During negotiations, the city promised to contribute €22 million to the extra costs of realising the environmental objectives. However, this money was never placed at the disposal of the developers. Thus, indirectly, the city deviated from the original agreement.

By law and through practice, the development contract is a powerful policy instrument. If skillfully negotiated by the authorities, utilising land price whenever possible, it has the potential for strongly influencing construction. However, in the contracts of Sickla Udde, the first 10 signed in Hammarby Sjöstad, the imprint of the Environmental Programme is not evident.

4.1.2. Playing the game: the mould scandal

Unlike the routine negotiations around development contracts, a situation such as the mould scandal will probably never occur again. In it, two main sustainability issues were at stake, those of residents’ health and construction quality.

From the start of construction on Sickla Udde, officers of the project team made informal rounds of the construction sites. In April 2000, a contractor within the Skanska Group was found to have problems with on-site management; construction materials were stored without rain protection, the concrete framework was not allowed to dry properly, and so on. From the onset, the team documented these shortcomings through photographs and notes.

Already during the early stages of this situation, there were negotiations on the team’s initiative. Its members tried to directly influence the site manager and when this gave no results, they approached the local and company level environmental officers, as well as others within the Skanska Group. The team claimed that owing to the way in which the site was being managed, moisture would cause problems. The other party argued that on-site management followed normal practice. Furthermore, the site manager was known to build at low costs, giving him a strong position in his company.

In January 2001, residents were moving into the buildings and the moisture problems, now visible as mould and an obvious health hazard, became public. Stockholm’s newspapers wrote about the ‘Moisture and Mould Scandal’, the trade press followed. Based on their documentation, the team members were able to fully exploit the moment: they called a crisis meeting where all developers and main contractors in Sickla Udde were represented by their principals. A crisis group was formed and experts were summoned. Skanska dismissed their site manager and the damaged buildings were reconstructed at great cost. Thus, all contractors and developers in Sickla Udde were actively involved in negotiations when Skanska was ‘brought to book’. The team had the upper hand; the others were on the defensive. Later on, the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning organised a round table with representatives from the sector, at least momentarily questioning the principle of the contractors’ internal control.

Two results remained after the buildings were reconstructed and public interest waned: the Hammarby Sjöstad contractors developed methods for construction under covering and improved the on-site storage of materials. Furthermore, in the later development contracts, the project team and the contractors agreed that the team should make regular inspections and discuss problems with the site managers. In their environmental reports, the team shows that on-site management and construction routines were profoundly and permanently influenced (Stockholms Stad 2003). Following the debate in the trade press, the intervention by national authorities and so on, the mould scandal affected contractors nationwide.

4.2. . . . but the game was staged

The previous sections have shown that, on the one hand, the full potential of the development contracts was not utilised, while, on the other hand, the project team profoundly influenced construction
practice during the mould scandal, although its formal power was restricted. To explore this difference, we compiled two narratives of the prehistory of events leading up to these situations of opportunity and the external events that conditioned negotiations from outside (Figure 2). Together, they illustrate the staging of the game for the team’s negotiations. As before, empirical data were taken from previous studies.

The team was established in January 1997 and is still functioning, albeit in reorganised form. During its first years, it had a head, a secretariat and seven representatives from city administrations and companies, the ‘heavyweights’ being the City Planning Administration, the Roads and Real Estate Administration and the Environmental Administration. Up to 1999, the team was also a true project organisation, outside the ordinary line organisation of the city and with an office located in the Hammarby Sjöstad area.

4.2.1. ... but the game was staged: going for the Olympic Games

At the beginning, the comprehensive planning of Hammarby Sjöstad was guided by an overarching vision characterised by words such as ‘modernist’, ‘inner city-like’, ‘urban’, ‘dense’, ‘lake view’ and ‘close to nature’. In the mid-1990s, leading city politicians proposed that Stockholm host the 2004 Olympic Games. The consultants that helped Sydney apply for the 2000 Games were employed, and it was decided that Hammarby Sjöstad was to be the Olympic village. As a result, the planning activities and public interest in the area quickly gained momentum. The application process proper lasted less than 2 years, from the City Parliament’s passing the proposal in late 1995, through the formal application in August 1996, to the International Olympic Committee’s awarding of the Games to Athens in September 1997.

During that short period, many activities were initiated, re-structuring the development of Hammarby Sjöstad and adding its transformative focus on environmental issues and sustainability. The Environmental Programme, the Quality Programme for Design and the Hammarby Model of integrated infrastructure were all decided upon; work on Sickla Udde’s Regulatory Detail Plan was ongoing and the development contracts for the same area were negotiated. The involvement of Stockholm’s leading politicians and of a
steering committee consisting of the heads of the city’s ‘heavyweight’ administration departments and municipal infrastructure companies established the team as the city’s main co-ordinating and executive body for Hammarby Sjöstad. In doing so, they went far beyond the ordinary routines of planning and development to get the Olympics.

The Environmental Programme, the key document of the Sjöstad development, was initiated by the Australian consultants. It was then developed by mid-level officers from the city’s main administrations and infrastructure companies and was unanimously passed by the City Parliament during spring 1997, half a year before the Olympic Committee took its decision. When a draft was circulated to the city’s administrations and companies, the first reaction was ‘an outcry’, but after internal discussions in the line organisation, changes were few. The objective on energy was even sharpened. However, one of the mid-level officers indicated in an interview that the Australian consultants’ original programme was more far reaching than later versions.

4.2.2. . . . but the game was staged: the rise and fall of the project team

Once established, the project team had less than a year with the full impact of the competition for the Olympic Games. The first consequence of the ‘No’ to the games was that time pressure was reduced; then the strong interest of top politicians and city officials gradually waned. In spite of this, all involved declared that the team and the Environmental Programme should continue to guide planning and construction. Until a few years ago, the programme could still be found on the project’s website. However, the last time that it was publicly used by the project team was in 2002–2003, as the basis for the third Environmental Report (Stockholms Stad 2003).

The election held a year after the ‘No’ verdict resulted in a right-wing political majority coming into power in 1999. The new majority changed the project team’s internal organisation and subordinated it to the Roads and Real Estate Administration. Premises were moved from the Sjöstad area to the administrations’ ordinary office building. Thus, the project team became less independent. On the other hand, it was argued that this would give more influence over the city’s large infrastructure investments. In an interview, the Roads and Real Estate officer indicated that innovative investments such as the storm water treatment would have been difficult to procure in the original organisation.

The first head of project team resigned in late 1998. Early on, his successor merged the aims of the whole development, including the main points of the Environmental Programme, into one document, the ‘Success Criteria’. His ambition was to take away inconsistencies and contradictions, and reformulate the whole in a concise, communicative way (interview in February 2002). Interestingly, the criteria did not give any objectives for the energy use, which had initiated so much discussion a few years earlier. This document never gained official status through political decisions, but in interviews, contractors, developers and the project team’s environmental officer commented that it facilitated subsequent negotiations.

During the early 2000s, the first residents moved in, becoming a new stakeholder in negotiations. At general meetings, residents reintroduced a politically hot topic: initially, the planning norm was set at 0.5 parking place per flat, the same as in the city centre. However, as a result of residents’ pressure backed up by the new political majority, the norm was increased to 0.7.

5. Analysis and discussion

The four narratives presented above form the basis for returning to the overarching research questions:

- How did the project team manage to incorporate the Environmental Programme into the ongoing, ordinary development process?
- Why were some negotiations more successful than others?
To what extent and how was the project team’s work influenced by external events and forces?

What in more general terms can be learned from these negotiations?

The idea of Stockholm as host for the Olympic Games resulted in rapid, concerted action and established the project team. The active involvement of politicians and city officers combined with the general public interest quickly set the stage for the project team as the exceptional meta-governor of an otherwise ordinary network of actors. In Sehested’s (2009) terms, the politicians and officers rapidly designed, framed and participated in an extensive network of actors. In parallel, the Environmental Programme articulated the new policy discourse. Thus, the project team’s negotiations were extensively staged from the outside during the formative years, lasting till the year 2000.

During less than a year (January–September 1997), the project team and the other actors had the construction of an Olympic Village as their main objective and all documents and policy instruments were a means to that end. Only with the ‘No’ from the Olympic Committee did the programme’s ‘twice as good’ gradually become an overarching development objective on a par with the original vision.

During the period when hosting the Olympics was still a possibility, staging facilitated the project team’s efforts, counteracting the inertia of an ongoing planning process. Afterwards, the waning interest and the gradual return of ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 1959) staged negotiations more restrictively. The change of political majority also reframed negotiations, for good and for bad.

On the other hand, the narratives illustrate that with a few exceptions the project team did not stage its own game or change the rules for negotiations with developers and contractors. Instead, its members adopted a consensus-seeking and conformist approach. In negotiating the development contracts, there were even elements of a ‘negative control game’. Considering the project team’s organisation, this makes sense, as it was not a political body orientated to work for better policies, standards and practices. Instead, it was essentially an operative organisation composed of representatives from city administrations and companies, established to realise a given programme. However, in the formative moment of the mould scandal, the project team actively framed, designed and managed network negotiations – seizing the chance – since its members were well prepared. The Success Criteria was another attempt at network framing.

When assessing the project team’s strategic effort to ‘play the game’, the Environmental Programme is the baseline. In negotiations on the development contracts, there was little of network framing or design, and network management stayed essentially within the routines of an ordinary development. In a number of ways, the negotiator compromised and lowered standards in relation to the programme: first, by not resolving the conflict between the two environmental programmes. Second, negotiations concerning the level of energy use were resolved through exclusion. From previous research (Green 2006; Svane 2008), we know that the Environmental Programme also left little imprint on the Regulatory Detail Plan for Sickla Udde.

On the other hand, the project team both staged and played the game actively during the mould scandal. During its first phase, the project team was on the defensive but documented the problems. When the scandal became public, its members could use their documentation to frame negotiations. Through arranging meetings for contractors, developers and a wider audience, they designed a temporary network of actors that could be extensively managed and manipulated. The project team’s counterparts now included all contractors and developers of Sickla Udde. During the third phase, the number of stakeholders grew, at least indirectly, to include the whole construction industry. In this phase, the project team played a secondary role in network framing and management, but the pressure on Sickla Udde’s developers remained. Thus, negotiations related to the mould scandal were offensive, and the same can be said...
about the project team’s arranging competitions on best pilot project and car-sharing system, as studied in previous research.

In general, the project team also succeeded in retaining some of the original objectives. In the Environmental Report of 2002/2003, goal achievements to date were assessed in relation to the programme, and it was established that in a number of aspects, the objectives had been realised. A recent research-based evaluation (Pandis and Brandt 2009; Pandis Iverot and Brandt 2011) supports this assessment.

Since the project team in general had a strong position through the staging by city politicians and officials, why these compromises? Although negotiations proper took place during a short, intense period, preparatory positioning had been ongoing for years and resulted in preliminary land assignments, land purchase and so on. The project team was not established until late in this process. Furthermore, most of its officers had been working with the development of Hammarby Sjöstad according to established routines before they were merged to a project organisation and jointly given the role of meta-governor. The Environmental Programme was developed at the same time, and it was introduced into negotiations as a finished product, not developed with the involvement of the project team or the developers. All these factors contributed to path dependency or ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom 1959).

It appears that negotiations that were burdened with a long prehistory, that is, those that started before the project team was established and the programme was finalised, were more ‘chances lost’. On the other hand, negotiations without a prehistory, such as the mould scandal, became more ‘chances taken’. The aforementioned competitions and some other situations studied in previous research can even be said to be ‘chances created’ by the project team, since they would not have occurred had the project team not initiated them.

The environmental objectives state that ‘... the experience, the knowledge and the technology that is generated in the process shall be disseminated ...’ (Stockholms Stad 1997, authors’ translation) and that the technological systems to be developed should also be educational.

To what extent, then, did negotiations result in learning? To our knowledge, this has never been systematically assessed. However, we know from interviews and documents that those directly involved gained substantially in knowledge – on environmental and sustainability issues as well as on the role of meta-governor in network governance. Furthermore, the organisational memory of the team and the other actors as a network gradually benefited from that in the later stages of the development. Interviews indicate that learning outside the team was slow in uptake. Officers involved in contemporaneous large developments were said to argue that since the Sjöstad development had its special programme and project team, similar efforts were not applicable to their work. However, in recent years, the original ambition has started to gain ground and, as mentioned in the introduction, the Sjöstad development is now used as a basis for learning. For example, the Royal Seaport even has the ambition to go beyond the outcomes of Hammarby Sjöstad. Ongoing research on other recent planning projects in Stockholm also indicates that city administrations and officers have learned from the Sjöstad project. Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, Hammarby Sjöstad still attracts study visitors from abroad in large numbers. Thus, with a delay of some 10 years, the newness in negotiation content, meta-governance and network organisation have gradually gained momentum.

6. Concluding remarks and recommendations

The narratives presented in this article clearly illustrate how sustainable development is subject to processes of negotiation, interpretation and conflict. They also clearly illustrate that issues are left outside negotiations for different reasons. We now return to these processes and issues, to draw some general conclusions and make some future-orientated recommendations. As in all case study research, there are limits to generalisation (Flyvbjerg 2004). Therefore, careful reflection on
where and when the recommendations are applicable is a must. However, we claim that the following lessons learned from the negotiations of the Hammarby Sjöstad Environmental Programme, by its meta-governor the project team, are also of relevance for other similar planning projects.

When ordinary negotiation practices in a planning project, that is, business as usual, are challenged by, for example, sustainability as a new series of aims, these aims should be introduced in parallel with other overarching and project-specific aims.

If the new aims are introduced into an ongoing, routine negotiation process, they can easily be seen as complications and obstacles. The development of the Western Harbour of Malmö in southern Sweden has many similarities with Hammarby Sjöstad. However, in its planning, the environmental objectives were negotiated with developers and contractors early in the process, creating a sense of joint ownership and more of mutual learning (Green 2006).

When ordinary negotiation practices in a planning project, that is, business as usual, are challenged by, for example, sustainability as a new series of aims, there is a need for a stronger project organisation.

Routines, path dependency and ‘muddling through’ are properties of a negotiation process that resides with the organisation as well as the individuals. Negotiations call for experienced officers. However, given a set of out-of-the-ordinary objectives, the officers need guidance and support beyond what the new objectives can provide. Closer collaboration also seems a prerequisite. A project organisation, with a formal core, a meta-governor and network extensions, could provide this. This cannot unambiguously be concluded from the Hammarby Sjöstad case alone. However, it is supported in the literature on the theoretical background.

Inviting new actors and seeking new forms of collaboration increase the field of options.

The ordinary planning process has negotiations in a well-defined and well-known project organisation, even if the combination of negotiators is unique. Once a project team is given the role of meta-governor, it can intentionally widen the ordinary organisation, iteratively asking ‘What new measures to take?’ and ‘Which new actors to involve?’ (e.g. through ‘What–Who’ exploration; Wangel and Gustafsson 2011). As a consequence, the element of network design would increase and new forms of public–private partnerships could be identified, all resulting in more aims being realised. Methods such as social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994) could further facilitate this.

The project’s contributions to its own sustainability objectives should be evaluated during and after each negotiation, as well as after the whole is finished.

The planning project has a series of negotiations ending with plans passed, contracts signed, competitions decided and so on. Such major events should be monitored during negotiations and afterwards evaluated against the project’s sustainability programme. If sufficiently large scale, the project could have its own annual assessment report. Results should be communicated to a wider public and to project actors, where they could help reduce path dependency and muddling through.

The concept of situations of opportunity highlights the prehistory and outcomes of a negotiation besides the formative moment proper and can widen the understanding of informal and formal structures.

Policy analysis highlights the formal means and the formative moment of a long process. Its prehistory of informal positioning, negotiations, conflict resolution and learning are less visible. The concept of situations of opportunity as used in this article helps explore additional aspects of the subprocesses within a large planning project. Like the exploration of new actors and measures through network design, it has the potential of widening the actors’ view of the opportunities of the situation.
In project-specific negotiations, introduce and retain the tension between what is short-term doable and long-term necessary.

Visions of the sustainable city abound, but seldom relate to a specific region or a given time in the future (Girardet 1999). The ‘planetary boundaries’ (Rockström et al. 2009) and similar concepts are even less context related. As we have seen, the Hammarby Sjöstad project has no vision of sustainability that goes beyond the Environmental Programme. Today, the nearest approximation of a vision specifically for Stockholm but with elements of urban sustainable development would be the new regional development plan (Regional utvecklingsplan för Stockholmsregionen (RUFS) 2010), which has a vision for 2050, with aims and strategies to match. The city of Stockholm has the target of becoming a fossil-fuel-free city by 2050 (Stockholms Stad n.y.). Such visions influence the long-term development of a city through persuasion, not through formal power (Healey 2007, 2009). Project-specific negotiations on sustainability can utilise this informal influence using the vision document for developing a sustainability programme and assessing the outcomes of negotiations. In this way — although the vision cannot be realised within one project — compromises are highlighted, and the negotiators learn about the tension between the short-term doable and the long-term necessary.

Note
1. Today, the Development Administration has the same role.

Notes on contributors
Örjan Svane: Department of Urban Planning and Environment, KTH The Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
Josefin Wangel: Department of Urban Planning and Environment, KTH The Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
Lars A. Engberg: Danish Building Research Institute, Hørsholm, Denmark
Jenny Palm: Technology and Social Change, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden

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